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As human beings, the exercise of our professional roles demands that we relate to others. 
Relationships, however, challenge the self in a way that requires us to act with integrity. 
Different approaches to integrity configure diverse ways of cognitively and intuitively feeling 
and acting in our relationships. Moreover, different ways of understanding human 
development are related to different ways of understanding integrity in the self. While not an 
exhaustive account, we sketch out three models of human development that capture much of 
this diversity, the so-called autonomous self (AS), processual self (PS) and inter-processual 
self (IPS). Each has a particular way of understanding how self-integrity and congruent action 
come to be.  
The AS and PS models understand integrity as internal coherence thanks primarily to rational 
exercise, with priority given to the content of action, while relations are utilised as resources. 
AS and PS focus on cognition through rational or emotional and external mastery of our 
relationships and own integrity (self-integrity is also handled as a cognitive exercise that 
mirrors how external relations are understood). The IPS understands integrity as the dynamic 
that leads to growth and cognition itself is a relational act that, when it arises from within, 
affects all dimensions of the person and hence how we ethically relate to others and ourselves. 
Different kinds of integrity are also related to practical wisdom. Based on this, we explore 
consequences of these different ways of understanding self-integration and relationships for 
approaching management and leadership roles, aiming to open up reflection on relational 
integrity and personal development via education in the field of management/leadership. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As human beings and professionals we 
undoubtedly need others in order to make 
sense of ourselves and grow into who we 
are, as well as to work in common, while 
co-creating goods in organisations and 
groups made up of family, business and 
society. But relational expectations may 
create strong demands or emotional 
pressures and experiences that lead to 
personal conscience and wider inner ethical 
conflicts (Akrivou et al., 2011). For 
instance, what others expect from us in our 
relationships may conflict with what we 
hope or wish for, or what we wish would 
occur may oppose others’ conceptions of 
duties to oneself and perceived professional 
obligations, such as loyalty to employers 
versus concern for action that supports 
personal well-being, as well as that of the 
groups we care for and the wider 
professional communities we partake in.  
Figuring out how to navigate and grow in 
our relationships is perhaps at the heart of 
all our roles, whether professional, societal 
and familial. Virtuously navigating the 
world of relationships is not just about 
learning to follow a certain professional 
rulebook, nor just a matter of technical or 
theoretical reason. Above all, it is a matter 
of living well and enabling a good life for 
others.   Hence, it requires a broader and 
more finely tuned awareness of the self, 
others and the given context, which 
involves certain cognitive effort that is both 
complicated and uncertain. Every person is 
able to act in a fine and appropriate manner 
based on an integrated sense of self, or 
personal integrity, both of which are used in 
the literature on human developmental and 
adult psychology to refer to the moral 
maturity of persons who act (agents). The 
verb ‘to integrate’ captures, at the level of 
the self, the personal capacity to combine, 
unite, blend or put together, assemble, join, 
coalesce, and fuse various differentiated 
and yet interdependent aspects, parts and 
components of the self. 
‘Integrity’ in psychology and moral 
philosophy refers to the quality of being 
honest and adhering to strong moral values 
and principles, as well as the state of being 
whole and undivided (Paladino, Delbosco 
& Debeljuh, 2007). Integrity in the self 
elevates the importance of personal moral 
constancy of character (Robson 2015). It is 
a personal asset, which deeply predisposes 
the self toward adapting to novelty and 
complicated relational, contextual and role 
demands, while displaying an enduring, 
solid moral character; it allows flexibility to 
appropriately tune forms of personal action 
into contextual aspects and their particulars, 
while enabling virtuous action (Koehn, 
2005).  
We argue that different approaches to 
integrity and self-integration enable diverse 
ways of relating to who we are and action 
in face of relationships within the wider 
context and the particulars that surround us 
in the exercise of our roles. We also suggest 
that these arise from salient, distinct ways 
of understanding human development and 
personal and shared growth. While not an 
exhaustive account, we sketch out three 
models of human development—the so-
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called autonomous self (AS), processual 
self (PS) and inter-processual self (IPS). 
Each has a particular understanding 
(cognition) or corresponding mindset, 
which defines how being, integrity and 
action are understood, which, in turn, drives 
their respective ways of approaching 
relationships that often come into conflict. 
The AS and PS models understand integrity 
as internal coherence thanks to primarily 
rational exercise; they prioritise the content 
of action and/or the subject’s internal 
regulatory focus (at the level of the will or 
one’s emotional aspects of self). In these 
models, the self cognitively managed 
integrity, while relationships are seen as 
resources. They maintain a twin focus on 
subject-specific mental regulation, aiming 
toward mastery, but in contrasting ways. 
Namely, to maintain integrity in both the 
self and relationships, AS relies on 
attendance to specific rules and normative 
frameworks, or perceived expectations and 
obligations that one adheres to as mental 
models that guide internal regulation 
processes.  
PS does so as well, but with the difference 
that it has an extrinsic focus on 
relationships rather than (moral) rules; in 
this model, diverse psychological faculties 
(cognition and/or emotion) are chosen with 
a focus on how to best enable action from 
the subject to master relationships and 
maintain a sense of independence and 
autonomy. Hence, for PS, relationships are 
essential means for mastery in the pursuit of 
one’s ends. AS and PS focus on cognition 
through rational or emotional mastery of the 
outside world; relationships therein are 
externally significant, but they are 
perceived of as threatening to or enabling 
(instrumental role) of the subject’s 
relationship to his/her own integrity. 
Integrity is also handled as a cognitive 
exercise that mirrors how external 
relationships are understood). PS leads 
toward adaptive dialogical mastery; it 
receives and acts on emotions by self-
mastering them, while mastery of others 
evidences the subject's cognitive 
development through acts of relationships. 
There’s an aspect of relationships here, but 
not a genuine relational act of cognition. AS 
relies more on the subject's rational actions 
and straightforward following of normative 
or other rule-based frameworks. This makes 
it easier for action within the framework of 
AS’s integrity to maintain a stable pattern 
in the handling of relational pressures (i.e., 
via a more detached and principled 
approach), while PS is more sensitive to 
context and has the advantage of higher 
adaptability and flexibility in relational 
conflicts.  
The IPS model understands integrity as a 
dynamic for personal growth due to the fact 
that cognition is itself lived as a relational 
act that, when it arises from within, affects 
all dimensions of the person. Hence, in IPS, 
relating to others is an act driven by seeking 
to grow with others through our intimacy; 
and relating to ourselves is driven by a 
deeper personal interiority towards 
be(coming) more of the person one is (our 
personhood is wider and richer than our 
perceived or developed self at any given 
point). Ethically, this purports a different 
kind of integrity from within the relational 
act of IPS cognition, whereby relationships 
become essential for better and more deeply 
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developing self-knowledge. At the same 
time, this integrity dynamic captures a more 
profound personal predisposition in the self 
that tends toward action enabling personal 
growth via the experience of our own and 
others’ humanity. In IPS, growth happens 
through relational acts within the logic of 
the gift (appropriately giving and 
receiving). 
IPS’s conception of integrity makes it 
possible to understand certain aspects of 
AS-PS’s models of integrity as an aspect of 
their globality. For instance, in the IPS 
model, the relationship is “integrated” 
(characterised by mutual integrity), hence 
individual self-integration arises as a 
natural consequence and the actor(s) do not 
have to self-regulate in order to achieve 
consistency with their own integrity. But in 
AS-PS models, one can be self-integrated 
without being integrated with others; one 
can achieve, for example, a sense of moral 
character including the certainty of action 
within an idealised conception of virtue, 
while that same action denies the logic of 
the gift or shies away from giving and 
receiving the gift of others. Thus, AS-PS 
action is oriented toward managing a sense 
of integrity in the self, and relationships are 
approached as separate domains or become 
instrumental for self-integrity, which may 
generate conflict with others’ if 
achievement of self-integrity violates their 
integrity or dignity, or the true possibility of 
the gift. 
The AS conceives of human growth as a 
result of individual productive activity, 
which aims toward cognitively “mastering” 
the environment as a focal object, according 
to the wishes of actors-subjects, or forces 
others to fall in line with the mental model 
of being AS even when persons of virtue 
are encountered. This action cancels out the 
possibility of interpersonal encounters in 
our humanity. The resulting action is 
facilitated by self-regulation guided by 
externally-provided moral frameworks and 
rules. For AS, as the sense of being a self as 
subject prevails and emphasis on 
cognitively relating to others grows, AS 
distrusts oneself and one’s personhood. 
Thus, AS tends toward regulation of 
relationships with preference for the rule 
that relationships should obey normative, 
predefined expectations or power and 
authority frameworks.  
In certain situations (especially threatening 
ones), AS may respond to relational 
demands in a way that implicates one’s 
sense of (weakening) personal integrity by 
means of rational choices through denial of 
relationships. This orients AS toward 
familiar integrity pursuits via increasing 
autonomy and independent action based on 
the will if no laws or dominant moral rules 
are violated. The PS model is presented as a 
variation on or mature form of the AS 
model because it values reason, albeit 
through an attempt to systematically and 
more impulsively follow one’s will without 
the burden of moral normative rules that 
restrict action. Action takes on more 
dialectic forms of integrity whereby the self 
as subject instrumentally harnesses 
relationships according to the wishes of the 
subject-master in the process of achieving 
self-regulation. In AS-PS models, ethics is 
in addition to individual pursuit of self-
actualisation, while AS and PS models can 
also be technically synthesized as a fused 
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way of action that cleverly combines the 
above forms to resolve the antagonisms 
involved. 
Conversely, we suggest that IPS is a 
genuinely integrative mindset (i.e., it does 
not technically combine AS and PS in an 
effort to resolve their antagonistic mindsets) 
because it aims to act from within personal 
intimacy and interiority. In IPS, ethics is an 
integral part of being and action, whereby 
profound personal predisposition in the self 
also entails the basis, process and outcomes 
that guide an integrity growth dynamic that 
is both personally and interpersonally 
oriented (involving both the giver and the 
receiver). This dynamic within IPS integrity 
is driven by its telos (higher purpose or 
goal), which corresponds to acting in ways 
that enable personal growth via an 
experience of our own (and others’) 
humanity.  
Action driven by a purposeful orientation 
involves deeply wishing to grow to 
be(come) more aware of our personhood, 
which, as noted in IPS, is about how to be 
virtuous while being oneself. Personhood is 
wider than our known identity and so, for 
IPS, its relational, personalist basis of 
integrity allows for personal growth. 
Practically wise forms of action that enable 
this purpose are only possible in IPS 
through relational acts within the logic of 
the gift (appropriately sharing in giving and 
receiving). Within this context, IPS orients 
acts of personal integrity via parallel 
acknowledgement of personal feelings, 
affections and agency-driven action that 
systematically respect the shared humanity 
of all involved. The integrity involved in 
the IPS conception of the self and action 
places human dignity as the key root, 
process and purpose of action, while ethics 
is integral to it at every moment of being 
and action– of course in IPS knowing and 
acting are always unified in IPS’s unified 
theoretical definitions (Akrivou, Orón, & 
Scalzo, 2018).   
Integrity, from within an IPS perspective, 
(cognition) is a personal - relational act. As 
noted, self-integration in IPS relies on one’s 
personhood, which involves dignity 
dwelling both in personal uniqueness and 
intimacy, and in our shared humanity. From 
within personal intimacy (intimacy and 
relationships being the only ways for us to 
capture and realise, or “know” our 
singularity) springs the ‘logic of the gift’ 
(Schrift, 2014; Hénaff, 2003), which 
involves how best to grow relationships in 
an ethical way; including welcoming, 
acknowledging and properly accepting 
(honouring, elevating) gifts received from 
others, as well as our own personhood. 
Relating to others and the gifts we receive 
implicates benevolently and lovingly 
growing in our action beyond the logic of 
duty and obligation (Baviera, English & 
Guillén, 2016).  
Integrity in the IPS model involves relating 
well and aiming to deepen our sense of 
humanity both in understanding who we are 
and in facing other human beings in the 
realm of personal and social relations. This 
involves honestly seeking out appropriate 
ways of acting and doing good for all 
involved, including one’s own good, which 
involves practical wisdom, i.e., the 
appropriate forms of practical–ethical 
reason sensitively enacted with concern for 
all involved. Hence, for the IPS model, 
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ethics represents a path toward growth, and 
self-integrity enables acting as a person of 
virtue, a human being who is able to use 
practical-ethical reason for the good 
(understanding and acting in a practically 
wise manner as to how means, ends and the 
teleological aspects of human action should 
be connected for us to feel respect for 
ourselves and others). Table 1 summarises 
these two different approaches to integrity 
(AS and PS models versus the IPS’s 
integrity conceptions). 
 
Table 1: Two divergent models with respect to integrity: 
 AS and PS models IPS model 
Integrity is understood 
as:  
The qualifier of the subject’s 
state of maturation  
Dynamics of growth 
Integrity refers to:  The subject  
Action from within a sense of 
duty, obligation or moral feeling 
towards others 
Action from within one’s 
personhood (dignity involving 
both personal uniqueness and 
intimacy, and shared humanity).  
Personal intimacy (which 
springs from the ‘logic of the 
gift’) 
Integrity is achieved 
through:  
Extension of the domain over 
which the subject performs in 
the environment and with 
respect to herself 
Acting via cognitive mastery 
Benevolent and loving action 
with others  
Intensification and improvement 
of interpersonal relationships 
 
Interpersonal 
relationships occur:  
At a second and optional 
moment after individual action 
aiming at individual self-
constitution; the subject sees as 
key priority to not endanger self-
constitution (maintaining 
cognitive mastery).  
Objects of an acting subject’s 
cognition. Through acts of 
First and necessary moment that 
is constitutive self that emerges 
later 
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rational or emotional mastery of 
the outside world, relations are 
instrumental to self-integrity; 
they are externally significant as 
threatening or enabling subject’s 
relationship to his/her own 
integrity 
Ethics is: An addition to individual 
maturation. Managed as a 
domain of mastery: Mastery of 
moral self-identity (managing 
action and regulation of self to 
follow a moral rule or more 
emotivist resolutions of 
relational and identity conflicts 
according to the will) 
Inherent in the entire relational 
act of growing, inherent in being 
and growing as integrated 
person 
Ethical integrity is: Coherence with one’s own 
principles, will, moods etc. 
The internal reciprocity and 
reception of others 
 
In this article, we introduce the AS, PS and 
IPS models based on how their focus on 
cognition relates to oneself and personal 
integrity and the problem of human growth 
and action, as well as corresponding ways 
whereby personal and social relations are 
understood.  
2. MORAL PSYCHOLOGIES OF THE 
AUTONOMOUS SELF (AS) – 
PROCESSUAL SELF (PS) VERSUS 
THE INTER-PROCESSUAL SELF 
(IPS) 
2.1 The modern perspective underlying the 
AS and PS – Cognitive Mastery 
The background and mindset that 
characterizes the moral psychology of the 
autonomous self (AS) supports the vision of 
integrity demonstrated through effective 
domain mastery  (Kegan, 1994; Ryan, 
1995; Ryan and Deci, 2000; 2004). The AS 
mentality is in line with philosophers who 
understand habit as a routine and virtue as 
an ideal value, and thus purports that human 
beings can be taught externally. This 
perspective corresponds to the 
neuroscientific approach that splits the 
brain into different modules and correlates 
each module with one function. Based on 
moral psychology, recent advances in the 
autonomous understanding of the self and 
its integrity are compatible with a self-
interested rational agent who can self-orient 
via the integrity of the will, which is 
understood as autonomous and formal.  
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Integrity, as an autonomous cognitive act, 
sets external rules to master the self-system 
of relationships. AS understands the self 
and agency as separate or, at times, in 
opposition to various “objects” or domains. 
At the heart of AS, integrity is found in 
different forms of cognitive mastery; higher 
forms of cognitive mastery appear to both 
capture managerial expectations and 
conform to externally established moral 
rules and conventions that embody those 
higher forms (Kohlberg, 1969).  
The AS paradigm holds an individualistic 
understanding of how integrity is 
experienced, i.e., through primarily 
rationalist principled action. For example, 
integrity in management or roles of control 
is premised upon distinct mastery of 
separate groups and individuals and the 
division of the organisation as a territory to 
manage with primary and secondary 
domains. The subject’s integrity requires 
cognitive distance from real persons, 
contexts, particularities and relationships 
since they include their humanity, which 
favours reliance on power or status as ways 
of imposing a subject’s will. It involves the 
reliance on external rules (regulation) and 
even abstract moral universals. It also 
requires a stance of personal and cognitive 
neutrality to all related objects and persons-
groups, while focusing on one’s primary 
duties (Mansell, 2013).  
Hence, AS integrity is compatible with a 
rationalist mature agent perspective whose 
integrity requires an autonomous, 
principled will. Adherence to external 
normative universal frames of action orients 
personal integrity toward preserving self-
constitution. Action that arises is self-
protective and comes in somewhat self-
interested forms of prudence. 
Deontological-driven action protects self-
identity via an alignment of self with 
primary interest groups– a rationalist 
thought process guides how to align the self 
with the categorical imperative. 
Accordingly, AS understands and 
experiences the relationship between (a1) 
duties that spring from an incumbent’s role 
duties as primary rules guiding action and 
(a2) key people or groups involved as a 
problem of mastery over independent 
relationships as additional domains. In 
accordance with AS, the motives of mature 
agents in leadership ought to be rationally 
seeking to align leader-agency with the self-
interests of their principals, taken to be the 
shareholders as understood in agency 
theory (Davis et al., 1997). 
In our research (Akrivou, Orón, Sclazo, 
2018), we also found that, as noted earlier, 
AS’s conceptions of self and action include 
the sub-variety called the “Processual Self” 
or PS. PS prefers a mastery experience 
through dynamic, on-going and fluid 
adaptation of action, which is often driven 
by more affective and intuitive processes, 
but genuinely personal action with concern 
for the person one relates to still escapes it. 
This includes changes to the subject’s own 
interests or adaptation to other people’s 
responses and action herein arises as an 
emotivist response to external stimuli. PS 
also focuses on cognitive mastery because 
relationships are essential means for 
mastering the pursuit of ends. Thus, AS and 
PS’s focus on relationships is external as 
socio-behavioural approaches to 
maintaining self-integrity and implies that 
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relationships are impulsively perceived 
either as threatening or enabling 
(instrumental role), positive or negative; 
they affect how the subject responds and 
adapts to action in relationships in order to 
maintain the subject’s relationship to 
his/her own integrity. Thus, intuitive social 
responses drive PS’s action, facing integrity 
challenges as a primary cognitive 
mechanism even if reason is used at times 
as a post-hoc mechanism to justify or 
communicate reasons behind adaptive 
strategies.  
AS and PS focus on maintaining one’s 
sense of being a subject, which also means 
that the self and identity are defensively 
maintained as core basis of who one is, and 
that integrity fears opening up wider 
exploration that involves the discovery of 
the person beyond identity elements in the 
self. Self-identity is a key concern in 
relation to how integrity is pursued. 
Integrity is also handled as a cognitive 
exercise mirroring how external 
relationships are understood. PS leads with 
purpose; it receives and acts on emotions 
while mastering them. At the same time, 
mastery of others proves the subject's 
cognitive development through acts of 
relationships.  
Given this, PS still aims for strategic 
control of action. For example, in terms of 
organizational roles, there is a preference 
for structure, and the use of fluid post-
bureaucratic structures, which emphasize 
team and social control, thus elevating the 
value of subjectivity. PS can be more 
amoral (than AS) in the chosen approach to 
relationships if the subject so wills and, 
rather than regulating emotions for 
cognitive mastery. It uses more chaotic (or 
we can call it strategically adaptive) 
emotional processing as a way to free the 
will towards acting in the direction that 
seems fitting. This can equip PS with 
greater ability to grasp opportunistic gains 
in certain situations, while maintaining a 
sense of integrity as compared with the AS 
since more adaptive responsive action is 
permissible in terms of action consistent 
with integrity. The focus is still cognitive 
mastery here, even in what may appear as 
the acting subject’s avoidance of any stable 
cognitive or moral framework, which 
appears as freedom to act as one wills at 
every moment, and is which, in turn, 
entirely in contrast with the IPS’s 
perception of freedom (Orón, Akrivou & 
Scalzo, 2019). Thus, this form of integrity 
relies on an ethical footprint that it doesn’t 
actually contain and is in reality a sub-
variety of AS.  
The AS and PS models understand the 
problem of integrity as a primarily rational 
exercise(s), with priority given to the 
content of action while relationships are 
seen as resources; for AS, maintenance of 
integrity in our relationships requires 
reliance on or attention to specific rules and 
normative frameworks. PS highlights 
relationships and diverse psychological 
faculties for mastering relationships as 
essential means in the pursuit of given ends. 
AS and PS focus on cognition through 
rational, external and emotional mastery of 
our relationships and our relationship to our 
own integrity.  
Behind the modernist reading of cognition 
that characterises AS and PS is the idea that 
cognition (mental models including the 
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will) drives action, and that cognition drives 
being, whereby integrity in relationships is 
seen as the ability to act while always 
maintaining safe distance that allows for 
freedom from others and always allows the 
subject to maintain the certainty of control 
over the self and relationships.  
This assumption shapes the understanding 
of wider human development theory 
regarding action with maturity in broader 
life domains, which in the last thirty years 
has influenced leadership and leadership 
development theory or leadership 
development teaching and practices (for 
example following models such as Flavell, 
1963; Harvey, Hunt & Schroeder 1961; 
Kegan, 1982, 1994; Lahey Laskow, 1986; 
Loevinger 1966, 1976; Perry 1970/99).  
Piagetian and post-Piagetian cognitive 
development psychologies share a common 
heritage with Piaget’s (1962) uni-linear 
stage theory of cognitive development 
(Flavell 1963), which “borrows” a 
structural genetic epistemology marked by 
a universal assumption of growth in 
cognitive terms and influences overall 
human growth. Indeed, in all of the 
Piagetian and post-Piagetian stage models, 
cognitive moral maturity is seen as 
associated with a dualistic hypothesis 
whereby initially an autonomous (AS) and 
subsequently a processual (PS) kind of 
cognitive meaning making underlie two 
opposing modes of human maturity. For 
example, key models that match up are 
from Kegan (1994) and Lahey-Laskow 
(1986). They propose a subject-object 
psychoanalysis oriented toward answering 
the question of how to best deal with life’s 
mental demands, which include 
relationships. These theories, despite their 
multi-dimensionality, emphasize a 
cognitivist approach to the self and mature 
action (Creamer, Baxter & Yue, 2010: 550 
and 552). These stage model(s) describe a 
subjective framework in which a person is 
embedded in the “assessment” of an object 
(which refers to a person, an act, or a 
situation in these works). Its basic 
assumption is that the subject’s autonomous 
growth must become the “object” of higher 
frames of mind. Each person’s mind is thus 
seen as capable of developmental shifts and 
as following a type of subject-object 
progression akin to AS. Thus, later on PS 
emerges in rejection of previous stages: this 
new PS challenge allows one to adaptively 
and reflexively respond to the 
transcendence of one’s “mind” with a 
Hegelian-like dialectic approach to 
relationships between agents who are 
valued in a subject to subject framework.  
Another seminal post-Piagetian piece 
corresponds to Cook Greuter’s 1999 
extension of Jane Loevinger’s (1966, 1976) 
theory, whereby PS emerges at the end in 
rejection of previous assumptions in line 
with an idealized AS mode of the self that 
seeks human integrity in self and identity. 
Cook Greuter (1999), based on Freudian 
ego development theory, understands 
problems of self growth as challenges of the 
ego rather than as a more general cognitive 
challenge. The main idealised pursuit here 
is how to overcome the ego, which results 
in the proposal of higher stages of ego-
transcendence.  
Naturally, an interest in integrity in 
relationships premised on a morally mature 
person’s ability for autonomous moral 
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reasoning brings us to Kohlberg’s cognitive 
moral development theory. This theory is 
the best example that critically displays the 
antagonistic interplay between AS and PS. 
The model focuses on moral reasoning 
maturity growth stages that enable higher 
meaning making and judgment, hence a 
special concern for moral action as a 
domain. At the end of his model, Kohlberg 
proposes a seventh stage of moral reasoning 
akin to PS, but it is not initially clear 
(Akrivou, Orón & Scalzo, 2018) if 
Kohlberg goes from AS to PS via a 
“rejection” of his main theory’s premises 
(which purport AS) or if he ultimately 
proposes a dualistic synthesis between AS 
and PS (which would mean not rejecting 
AS in line with Colby and Kohlberg, 1989; 
Kohlberg, 1969). We suggest (Akrivou, 
Orón & Scalzo, 2018) he has a rather 
dualist proposal. Drawing on Kohlberg & 
Mayer (1972), his earlier body of work 
focussed on AS (Colby and Kohlberg, 
1989; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981), while only 
his last alternative processual “mode” of 
human maturity switches to a moral 
maturity akin to PS (Kohlberg & Mayer, 
1972; Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990).  
However, Kohlberg’s work helps us to 
uncover and theoretically describe the 
differences and interplay between AS and 
PS (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). But even his 
latest revised theories do not help transcend 
AS and PS’s conflict or dualistic 
understanding.  
In mainstream psychological theory, 
theories from key modern psychology 
scholars (Deci and Ryan, 2002; 2013; Ryan, 
1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000; 2004; Ryan and 
Lynch, 1989) echo similar assumptions 
grounded on a universal model of self and 
cognitive integrative dynamics. They 
purport that self-integration is an 
aspirational ideal and a goal to be 
“mastered” via more mature states (not 
stages, in this case) of human development. 
The main theoretical premise aims to 
uncover how motivational integrative 
dynamics in the self function (Ryan, 1991). 
The focus here is psychological dynamics 
that activate inner tendencies, striving to 
cover various needs and domains, and 
gradually aiming to establish higher unity in 
the self (Ryan, 1995). The self is seen as 
lacking unity and, for them, self-
development seems to rely upon a 
dynamic–synthetic Hegelian synthesis type 
(Hegel, 1965) with systemic self striving 
towards gradual self-unifying processing 
and striving for self-autonomy therein 
(Ryan, 1995). This is seen as possible via 
two opposing or conflicting modes i.e., 
either via a more rationalist-cognitive 
processing mode that relates to AS, or via a 
more emotive and intuitive mode of 
processing that relates to PS. 
Such stage theories share a common 
biologically based assumption rooted in 
Werner’s 1948 orthogenic principle 
(Johnson, 2000) that personal integrity is 
characterized by a) it being autonomously 
mastered via the agent’s intense cognitive 
development, b) it only being possible in 
the highest levels of growth, c) it being 
mainly premised upon mastery of the self 
via a critical distance with the wider world, 
which firstly relies on the mastery of 
cognitive rules (the mastery of universal 
moral rules, which is seen as part of the 
post-conventional path of moral maturity in 
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the self). The modern paradigm on the self 
and action has key assumptions regarding 
integrity vis-à-vis the social world, 
including the idea that individual 
autonomous cognitive development enables 
the subject-agent to make good, clean, 
rationally calculated decisions regarding 
tactical and strategic choices of ends and 
means to master the self and relationships.  
However, these same authors recognize 
their key assumption as a weak hypothesis 
at a later stage when all of a sudden most 
cognitive stage development theories switch 
from a universal rule mastery approach to 
an antagonistic and more emotivist path 
premised upon intuitive, dynamic and 
adaptive kinds of action that avoids 
following cognitive rules. Yet, it is mainly 
concerned with response efficacy, reacting 
effectively to external stimuli based on the 
inner self’s will. This proposal is more akin 
to the PS model and its stage theories of 
cognitive development mainly appear at the 
end of post-conventional growth. It does 
not substantially overcome the assumptions 
and limitations of the AS model as it is still 
mainly concerned with how the self 
maintains its subject mindset in achieving 
successful autonomous “authorship,” which 
becomes a dialectic cognitive mastery 
approach to others.  
At a neuroscientific level, the cognitive 
dynamics of the Autonomous Self (AS) 
versus the Processual Self (PS) is found in 
that the former relies on System 2 (“slow” 
i.e., the mastery of critical, detached and 
rationalist knowledge that requires 
analytical cognitive processing). By 
contrast, the Processual Self (PS) relies on a 
synthesis between system 1 (“fast”) and 
system 2 (“slow”) (Kahneman 2011; 
Kahneman & Riis, 2005). This allows PS to 
rely more heavily and comfortably on moral 
intuition and adaptive cognitive processing 
responses as dominant modes of actions; 
while AS’s system 2 dominance makes it 
rely more on rules and maxims and sees 
action as best when detached from moral 
feelings, to operate cleanly and detached 
from (moral) feelings, AS may become 
more strongly so when someone tries to 
approach another from a relational point of 
view, which is often characterised as a 
threat to autonomy.  
It should be noted that, regarding the 
conflicting cognitive preference bases that 
distinguish AS (relying on an 
abstract/rationalist basis) and PS (relying on 
a cognitive functioning more akin to an 
intuitive and emotional basis), AS does not 
imply a lack of emotion or intuitive 
functioning, but rather a preference for 
rationalism in the face of choices and 
dilemmas related to action (Haidt, 2001) 
with integrity.  
2.2  The Inter-processual self: Integrity as 
relational act from within personal 
interiority 
The IPS presents a different paradigm for 
understanding the self and action that 
influences its view of action with maturity. 
It consists in considering human beings and 
human development as they really are, 
rather than in an idealized way, thus 
abandoning altogether the hypothesis of 
self-autonomy as a precondition for self, 
human action, meaning-making and moral 
and cognitive maturity itself.  
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The philosophical moral psychology of the 
inter-processual self is a novel theory based 
on an interdisciplinary dialogue between 
philosophy and psychology (Akrivou, Orón 
2016; Akrivou, Orón, Scalzo 2018). The 
paradigm of the Inter-Processual Self (IPS) 
is a broad, unified theoretical proposal on 
the self and action that understands and 
values the self, ethical action and human 
development beyond the mere logics of 
self-interest and obligation, suggesting the 
recovery of the so called “logic of the gift,” 
which highlights human freedom and 
gratuity for the sake of strong relationships 
(Hénaff, 2003).  
This model is based on interdisciplinary 
dialogue between philosophy and 
psychology and key philosophers for 
understanding this personalist virtue ethics 
proposal include Aristotle, Leonardo Polo, 
Alfred N. Whitehead, and Wang Yangming, 
as well as the psychologists Carl Rogers, 
Erik Erikson, and Viktor Frankl (Akrivou, 
Orón 2016; Akrivou, Orón, Scalzo 2018). 
IPS is deeply grounded in personalist 
philosophical assumptions on the self, life, 
human and social growth and action. 
Personalist philosophy regards the person, 
or each human being as a singular entity as 
the ultimate ontological, epistemological, 
explanatory, and axiological principle of all 
reality, but there are substantial variations 
when it comes to how different 
philosophical streams of personalism 
emphasize these aspects (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Polo’s 
philosophical personalism and Mounier’s 
personalist philosophy (1989) are 
influential in how the self and personal 
action are understood in the IPS (Akrivou, 
Orón 2016; Akrivou, Orón, Scalzo 2018). 
The central premise in this proposal is 
rooted in personhood and its approach to 
human beings and growth; IPS’s notion of 
personhood affirms that human beings have 
a singularity based on our intimacy and 
uniqueness, and that we can rely on our 
intimacy to lead action with a particular 
kind of freedom, which is “freedom for” 
affirming a relational ontology and a 
transcendental anthropology regarding what 
it is to be human i.e., the person is a unity 
that pre-exists action and life itself.  
This proposal starts from the Spanish neo-
Aristotelian and personalist philosopher 
Leonardo Polo and his three radicals 
(fundamentals), which philosophically 
capture the main approaches to personal 
being in the history of philosophical 
thought. The radical of nature— based on 
classical philosophy e.g., Aristotle’s 
works— states that we are all rooted in our 
distinctive and common psychological, 
biological and cultural assumptions. Based 
on our traditions or distinct roots, human 
nature includes the development of 
psychological and biological dimensions. 
Polo’s radical of the person— based on 
Christian philosophy, such as the works of 
Aquinas— affirms that human beings have 
a singularity and this uniqueness is 
expressed and exists due to intimacy. 
Finally, the radical of the subject —based 
on modern philosophy from Descartes to 
contemporary modern philosophers— is 
focused on the results or products of our 
agency; it affirms that human beings can 
produce novel solutions instead of 
perfecting or developing what we receive, 
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i.e., our nature. Polo proposes that these 
three “radicals” are present in each action 
and integrated by the person. Therefore, 
human action is born integrated. Applying 
this to integrative human growth, Akrivou, 
Orón and Scalzo (2018) suggest that being 
and growing as a human being requires the 
systemic integration of these fundamentals 
from within a person and, in addition, that 
this moral psychology fittingly harmonizes 
with virtue ethics’ normative philosophy.  
According to the scholars associated with 
IPS personal growth, it is meaningless to 
understand integrity outside of the notion of 
acting for and with others, within the frame 
of relational inter-personal growth. IPS 
hence understands integrity in the context 
of its cognition i.e., as a relational act that, 
when it arises from within, affects all 
dimensions of the person. How to ethically 
relate to others and ourselves purports a 
different kind of integrity whereby the 
“logic of the personal gift” highlights 
human freedom and gratuity for the sake of 
growing with others in personal human 
relationships that enable mutual virtuous 
growth. Such a notion of relationships from 
within a personalist gift perspective that 
supports human singularity and intimacy 
become essential for better self-knowledge 
and experience of our own humanity. 
Personal relationships with intimacy are 
central to being, as are our acts of integrity, 
which together help cultivate ourselves and 
our integrity, and help us learn how to live 
with and love others better. Secondly, 
according IPS’s understanding of moral 
psychology, human growth is shaped by 
free and open systems such that growth can 
be positive or negative (growing as a person 
of virtue or growing negatively as a person 
without virtue; emphasis is on showing that 
the basis of this action in the personal 
fundamental root (or ‘radical’) of being 
following the literature presented earlier in 
this summary). Yet, processual and 
responsive moral dialogue (Akrivou & 
Orón, 2016) in personal relationships can 
enable further self-understanding as to how 
to strengthen action fuelled by integrity. 
While IPS’s moral psychology understands 
the self and personal and systemic action 
guided by assumptions of open and free 
systems, its action aims to mutual virtuous 
growth in relationships, which requires 
deepening the quality of relatedness 
between those involved. 
These assumptions and the understanding 
of integration in IPS through Polo’s 
personal radical capture what is expressed 
by the notion of integrity in inter-processual 
terms in the IPS proposal. According to this 
model, “to integrate entails a maturation in 
which different aspects and relations 
differentiate and optimize to the same 
extent that they place themselves in a 
relationship with one another” (Orón 2015, 
114). Deep personal integration in IPS 
(which expresses a high form of personal 
integrity in moral psychological terms) 
means a kind of commitment and 
implication with the other’s growth beyond 
a rational choice or a decision driven by 
logic; it means implicating oneself with the 
other(s) for whom relationships with 
intimacy are part of who he is and becomes. 
This needs to happen from within the 
person and is directed through one’s 
interiority embracing oneself and the 
other(s) in their humanity. This of course 
Akrivou et al. Archives of Psychology, vol. 4, issue 1, February 2020 Page 15 of 26 
Copyright © 2020, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.       http://www.archivesofpsychology.org 
requires trust(ing) and learning to trust. 
This is possible only by acknowledging 
everyone as a transcendental and unique 
human being with the capacity to be free to 
love other human beings not for narrowly 
logical reasons, nor for a sense of moral 
obligation, or developed disposition to give 
care, but based on a deeper level of 
devotion that requires love and 
transcendence of narrowly logical forms of 
exchange. 
The self and integrity in the IPS are not 
separate domains, nor does the latter pursue 
the former for some (later) point in life. For 
IPS, the self and integrity are always a 
unity, a dynamically evolving relationship 
within which each part is closely related to 
the whole, but always maintains its internal 
identity driven from its own singular 
interiority that is complex, multifaceted and 
cannot be captured or measured, but only 
intuitively felt. In IPS, this human integrity 
as expression of interiority is expressed via 
our intimacy. Therefore, it is personal 
intimacy and not our cognitive capacity or 
mastery that enables us to grow. IPS 
understands and lives the relationship with 
others affectively from within our intimacy, 
both at the personal and systemic levels.  
It is therefore important to note that there is 
a key qualitative difference between the AS 
and IPS paradigms of integrity and to 
highlight that IPS begs the question of the 
degree to which each of the (integrally 
related) parts can be utilized in a higher 
order or capacity. This involves seeking to 
genuinely work in common for a naturally 
shared higher purpose (Alford & Naughton, 
2002). For the IPS mindset, it is not 
possible to consider other’s ethical virtuous 
growth outside of the system that considers 
the globality of all relating parts.  
The brain model that supports IPS 
corresponds to a lack of independent 
modules and to the existence of dynamic 
and temporal neural coalitions that reach a 
synchrony and coordination driven by 
intentionally purposeful action (Orón et al. 
2016, Orón 2019).  
The conception in IPS regarding personal 
integrity relies on the ethical quality of 
intimate relatedness to others because every 
human being organically integrates (from 
within one’s ethical self-system) her unique 
identity and internal quality of relating with 
every (specific) other. Personal growth and 
effectiveness are not “seen” as possible 
unless they come through a lens of trust and 
the “logic of the gift” (Baviera et al., 2016), 
while personal and interpersonal growth 
entails how to learn to love others better.  
AS and PS are based on the modern radical, 
while IPS integrates the three radicals from 
the personal radical. That is why the IPS 
integration model has the ability to 
welcome the good elements of the AS-PS 
integration model, while exceeding their 
limits. 
Thus, based on the latter, this personalist 
moral psychology harmonizes well with the 
normative philosophy found in what is 
called virtue ethics (Akrivou, 2016; Koehn, 
1995; Solomon, 1999). Both have a 
systemic (social-personal) and a 
teleological orientation (personal and wider 
growth which makes happiness and co-
existence possible for all) and draw on 
character. IPS self-integrity is a “personalist 
kind of relating to others respecting their 
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own integrity and uniqueness”, which is 
required by the premises of virtue theory on 
personal virtue rather than on principles and 
a rule-based principled will (Koehn; 1995; 
Solomon, 1992) guiding moral action.  
Broader human learning and development 
theory outside the key theories of 
development in modern psychology 
reviewed earlier, including the works of 
Rogers (1951; 1961, 1964) and Erikson 
(1994), are particularly relevant for 
illustrating how action with integrity and 
moral maturity result from the IPS way of 
living personal action in relations of mutual 
growth. IPS is more vulnerable; as personal 
action with integrity, it is concerned with 
relations as a true gift.  So one has to work 
to learn how to best act acknowledging 
one’s humanity through acts of intimacy 
involving the giving and receiving of the 
self and the other via one’s work; such 
action is however freely chosen and is 
neither imposed as a duty and obligation 
nor is understood as a mechanical, forced or 
transactional type of exchange.  
IPS integrity and relational growth are 
harder because institutional and wider 
systems in the economy and even in our 
political and social life (especially in late 
modernity) are geared toward functioning 
that mirrors AS and PS’s logic of action and 
corresponding integrity. So, learning to 
shift action with integrity from an 
autonomous or processual gear to an inter-
processual way of life requires a 
contemplated and genuine inner life of 
virtue; it calls for choices of helping-
psychotherapeutic relationships that respect 
and elevate personhood for mutual 
relational growth. What these mutual 
developmental relational approaches that 
enable IPS look like can be understood via 
the work of Rogers (1961), who illustrates 
the humanistic personalist psychology of 
IPS i.e., that relationships with the integrity 
of all involved do not present a model of 
maturity that simply synthesizes, or 
technically integrates (Akrivou & Oron, 
2016).  
From the very beginning of the therapeutic 
process, one relational party enters into a 
new interiority and a personal growth path 
is opened up. Immersing the self into an 
experiential path that frees the inner 
experiencing focus require trust, and 
gradually trusting the immediacy of 
experience within the person’s organism, 
which gradually frees us to release the 
integrity we all naturally share as persons 
(Rogers 1961: 131). Our common humanity 
and relationality are the basis of this 
integrity, as it is rooted in a deeper 
personalist root of being, as noted. From 
there, the person within is freed (which is 
wider and richer than the social and 
biological self we are habituated into), 
which allows the self to operate in full 
integrity. This can be trusted and produces 
predictable outcomes that allows for wider 
concern for true growth and well-being of 
all involved including the acting person, 
while it maintains the “novelty” and 
uniqueness that characterises each human 
being. This requires enabling true personal 
growth for all involved and happens by 
gradually trusting in the manifestation of 
one’s humanity. This reference to the inner 
experience process is only facilitated 
through the logic of the gift by the less 
vulnerable and the more morally and 
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professionally accountable party. The giver 
of the gift corresponds to the latter and the 
receiver acknowledges the need to grow in 
their journey to inner virtue and this, for 
Rogers, involves immersion in various 
experiences and feelings, as well as in the 
relationship of growth itself. Our proposal 
is of course less hierarchical and clear in the 
definition of roles compared to Rogers’ 
therapist-client relationship, but IPS 
coincides with Rogers in that growth is only 
possible through mutual growth in a 
personal relationship (Akrivou & Oron, 
2016) on the basis of intimacy and the 
singularity of each person. Rogers’ 
humanistic relational psychoanalysis 
provides IPS with a useful theoretical path 
toward turning “modern autonomous 
selves” away from a closed Cartesian 
subject-agent rationality and safe distance 
mode. 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT  
We argued here that different models of 
human development conceive of the person 
and personal integrity differently and, from 
them, contrasting kinds of action that 
denote how we relate to others in our 
profession and in life ensue. We suggested 
that integrity is not just about learning to 
follow a certain professional rulebook, nor 
just a matter of technical or social 
intelligence and skill regarding how to 
handle relationships to yield results for 
one’s own agenda and goals (e.g., to 
achieve narrowly conceived business 
profits). It requires a broader kind of 
awareness and maturity that enables 
reliance on a mature sense of what is good 
for all involved, a kind of knowledge-action 
appropriate mindset that enables acting for 
the good of all involved within practical-
ethical rationality, which frees personal and 
relational growth without violating human 
dignity.  
Regarding the existing antagonism between 
AS and PS in the self-autonomy paradigm 
of human growth, PS does not abandon AS 
because PS maintains the cognitive 
approach to relationships and roles in 
organisations and society, which require 
professional action and involve working 
with or influencing others. Within AS 
integrity, we primarily find a way to 
rationally regulate cognition towards ends 
within a preferred set of moral rules. 
Relationships are also understood as 
domains that should be normatively 
mastered and regulated to support the acting 
subject’s agenda in a way that provides 
certainty to the fulfilment of the actor’s 
goals.  
This mode of action in AS and PS recalls 
Perez Lopez’s (1993) critical review of the 
dominant models of organisational and 
economic agency, i.e., reliance on 
mechanistic/technical or psychosocial 
forms of management. The first (dating 
back to Taylorism) and the second (dating 
back to Hawthorne’s experiments and the 
dawn of psychosocial competence for more 
effective management) can be seen as 
corresponding to personal action in AS and 
PS. It draws on this and other related 
mental models through which relations are 
approached as an instrument or means to an 
end. These approaches to integrity rely on 
control or power through people in key 
roles (e.g., managers or administrative 
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decision makers) seeing as legitimate 
control in order to bring about the desired 
ends via an approach to relationships that 
values them instrumentally as resources or 
psychological capital (Luthans, Youssef 
and Avolio 2007), the value of which 
should be harnessed via effectively 
managing them as key success factors in a 
dynamic and networked world (Parikh, 
1999).  
Such approaches see integrity on the same 
level as actors’ personal values without 
deeply implicating ethical aspects of action 
regarding the wider common good of all 
involved through systematic ethical action 
relying on appropriate forms of practical 
wisdom. While AS is more likely to 
maintain a principled agency that orients 
technical reason in avoidance of 
straightforwardly unethical action, action is 
rather concerned with short term efficiency 
and mainly serves a narrow set of interests. 
In PS, reason is used in legitimation 
processes to enable positive support or the 
mastery of key groups or distinct people 
and it includes less concern for the integrity 
or dignity of all involved over time because 
a more subjective sense of integrity rules is 
legitimated in the process of action 
according to the subject’s will. Both AS and 
PS lack deeper concern for affective 
sources of information in the self that 
enable stronger forms of personal integrity 
based on richer personal orientation to 
virtue since, in both cases, emotion is 
regulated in the self.  
The IPS proposal is related to another way 
of understanding that allows personal action 
with integrity to not be concerned with the 
mastery of others, whether as a means or as 
an end of action. Instead, the main concern 
in IPS is how to relate to others from within 
our intimacy and singularity to work in 
common and achieve common goods while 
facilitating through them the personal 
(ethical) growth of all involved. In the 
integrity of the IPS, the output of action is 
not mainly concerned with the products 
produced, but is more concerned with how 
to enable personal flourishing of all 
involved. This is a more profound 
conception of integrity and its 
corresponding moral psychology acts to 
enable true sustainability of all involved.  
For this, as noted, the IPS relates to 
a richer form of cognition that properly 
integrates affective, ethical, practical and 
cognitive forms of rational excellence. 
Accordingly, IPS approaches integrity not 
just as a set of idealised values, but as a 
relational act that concretely implicates 
ethical aspects of action. It affects all 
dimensions of the person and others 
involved in the act as it arises from within 
the interiority of a person. For this reason, 
IPS is not based in neuroscientific 
understanding of modules 1 and 2 in which 
one system integrates (controls) another, as 
AS proposes, or the two systems are 
integrated (synthetized), as PS proposes. 
This transforms cognition as an essentially 
personal relational act, which transcends 
modular mentality because a way of 
understanding the integrated brain emerges 
in every system. The concern here is to 
bring back ethical inner life in the self, 
which contemplates how to grow as a 
virtuous person relationally rather than 
individually because interpersonal 
integration guarantees the integration of all 
Akrivou et al. Archives of Psychology, vol. 4, issue 1, February 2020 Page 19 of 26 
Copyright © 2020, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.       http://www.archivesofpsychology.org 
emotional, cognitive and intuitive aspects. 
This kind of integration requires more 
affective commitment in the exercise of 
professional roles, which involves relating 
to others with dignity, but also with 
compassion, forgiveness and a serious 
concern for a contemplated life that 
systematically relies on the practical 
wisdom of personalism (Alford, 2010). 
This suggested approach to integrity, and its 
corresponding approach to action in IPS, is 
closely related to what Perez Lopez (2002) 
describes as an anthropological approach 
that is a new and necessary turn in 
organisational life. It is important based on 
the need for more sustainable role 
organisations and on economics’ ability to 
enable social and ecological improvement. 
Human and social communities are 
premised upon a diversity of perspectives 
and interests and there are surely different 
pathways for pursuing certain ends, but not 
all can ensure the mutual growth of all 
involved and the common good. Beyond 
the need to control and the “skills and 
power needed to… impose moral rules and 
the values that help advance the well-being 
of the majority and engender power 
accumulation of a small group in society 
and organisational group” (Martinez-
Echevarria 2015; Scalzo, 2017), the IPS 
approach to action fits well with the 
anthropological approach and the logic of 
the gift, which is concerned with the 
relational act of integrity to support ethical 
and practical action and to better enable 
wider co-existence and growth starting 
from personal intimacy. Accordingly, from 
within an IPS perspective, action in 
relational aspects requires courage to 
transcend and transform the mind by 
embracing the act of leadership as 
something other than a duty or transactional 
exchange (e.g., for more access to power 
and control and better career prospects), 
and instead embracing it as an act of the 
gift, which means concretely loving human 
beings in their singularity and diversity and 
wanting to offer and receive within this 
context.  
This discussion informs how to think about 
approaching education (Orón, Akrivou & 
Scalzo, 2019), which, in this context, relates 
to professional and management 
development to transcend the limitations 
that we argue exist in AS and PS 
approaches. For AS, professional action is 
about integrity as a mainly psychological 
and cognitive act, whereby a focus on a 
theoretical set of principles and rules to 
guide action may be seen as an antidote to 
the kinds of agency produced by the twin 
AS and PS models. There, the idea is that 
ethics training and education and values-
related education (like in Kohlberg’s initial 
stages) can correct or add-on as new 
features of knowledge. So, in this model, an 
ethical orientation toward action is seen as 
possible through ethics as an add-on 
component, which is congruent with the 
Hegelian synthesis approach underlying the 
autonomous self.  
Models drive behaviour in this case, thus 
the importance in AS lies in cascading the 
appropriate mental model to others who are 
expected to adopt and follow the cascaded 
model maintaining a principled stance. For 
PS, cognition is still a psychological act 
whose activity focuses on a practical 
emphasis driven by a theoretical basis (the 
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mental model of who fills management 
roles and wields authority to impose their 
mental model on followers). This is not 
essentially different as AS and PS are sub-
varieties of the same mentality. Simply put, 
in PS, integrity is a rationalist act where its 
cognitive model aims to satisfy ends via the 
mastery of others. In this model, the 
developmental focus is on learning sets of 
skills and competencies (such as social 
intelligence, intercultural skills, etc.) or 
behavioural ethics that enable professionals 
to develop social, ethical and wider 
psychological faculties that support the will. 
This model of development also attributes 
importance to emotional adaptability, 
enriching the dynamic adaptive approach to 
relationships. Along with personal 
relationships, these other psychological acts 
also have an instrumental value, which 
enables control of action contexts (human 
and wider in all groups involved) and 
foment behavioural skills (e.g., nudging 
models, coalition building, motivation and 
control).  
This new moral psychology of the “Inter-
processual self” fundamentally involves a 
relational person who genuinely pursues a 
virtuous and good life. However, for IPS, 
integrity is initiated from the interiority of 
the person as a deeply personal, 
psychosocial act that is simultaneously 
relational, allowing the other to flourish and 
grow in common, albeit in the assumption 
of freedom and openness. This attends to 
the mutuality of what and how acts of 
giving and receiving ensue.  
Professional development implications 
therefrom include an ontology of each 
human being’s relationship-building based 
on one’s uniqueness and intimacy (freedom 
for). They are at the root of human action 
within the IPS. Professional role exercise 
under this assumption cannot therefore aim 
at mastery or control, or towards harnessing 
others’ psychological capital. It must trust 
relationships in terms of personal integrity 
oriented towards understanding and 
respecting one’s own and others’ 
singularity.  
Emotional education is important in this 
approach to help people learn to better 
recognize, trust and free the integration of 
emotion in the self as information. It also 
helps us understand and enable ethical and 
relationally responsive personal action, with 
the aim of facilitating personal growth 
through appropriate forms of practical 
wisdom that support a process of 
intensification of relationships and that 
constitute the human person in what she 
fundamentally is (Orón 2016, 2017, 2018b).  
A note should be made here to more sharply 
distinguish PS and IPS. Both consider 
relationships as central concerns in acts of 
personal integrity, but how relationships are 
valued differs radically. While, for PS, 
relationships have an instrumental value 
(which makes forms of PS leadership 
potentially dangerous for the common good 
as it can gradually erode social bonds and 
trust in a shared humanity), for IPS they 
have a final value, or value in themselves. 
IPS calls for a paradigm change in personal 
and professional development that puts 
interpersonal relationships and personal 
growth at the basis and centre of growth 
models; it does not just shift towards 
relationships as the core philosophies of 
educational programmes, but more radically 
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shifts our understanding of what personal 
integrity means and what relating to others 
from within the logic of person involves: 
the gift within free and open systems. The 
instrumental view of relationships can be 
found in programmes and proposals, but 
they do not help outside the mentality of the 
autonomous self.  
Different educational models allow us to 
approach wider aims and pillars of 
education, for example, learning to enable 
action, learning of being, learning to know 
and learning to co-exist with others in 
Delors et al., 1996 UNESCO report. This 
pushes us to inquire into a broader vision as 
highlighted by Peters (1966: 34, 1967), who 
warns us not to confuse an educated and a 
trained person. Emphasis should be given to 
how to enable a shift to personhood, hence 
we should educate people as ethical 
persons.  
This open debate helps us to see what 
personal transformation in education is 
about concerning developing integrity in 
relationships and, as suggested, how we 
face the problem of the relational nature of 
our integrity is based on contrasting ways 
of understanding the self and action in the 
paradigms of AS, PS and IPS and the 
cognition of integrity involved in each. For 
AS, cognition is a psychological act 
reduced to mastery via thorough 
rationalistic exercise; improving integrity is 
seen as a mainly cognitive and theoretical 
act with personal relationships as accessory. 
Professional practice here is more about 
how professionals relate to the content of 
the goals and ends they pursue and the 
theories and models allowing for them. For 
PS, the focus in education is how to acquire 
practical and applied skills and know-how 
and how to enable growth in psychosocial 
faculties to enrich action and reason. 
Effective adaptation to various aspects of 
one’s roles and accountability, which 
requires both intense cognitive effort and 
the mastery of the social world for impact 
and results, is central. This paradigm has 
dominated personal, management and 
organisational psychology for many 
decades starting in the early twentieth 
century. While popular, it has also resulted 
in the dehumanisation of the world at large 
and modern organisations (Dierksmeier & 
Pirson, 2009; Mansell and Sison, 2019; 
MacIntyre, 1999; Moore, 2005; Pirson et al. 
2010). 
For IPS, cognition as a psychological act is 
initiated from the interiority of the person 
as a way of interacting and positioning in 
the world, while accepting one’s 
vulnerability and humanity, which requires 
us to re-learn how to abandon our 
individual, safe distance from which we 
critique or instrumentally relate to others. 
Action from the personalist radical, which 
integrates nature and self-acceptance, 
requires production through mastery and 
requires learning to grow as a person who 
integrates appropriate practical-ethical 
forms of reason and wisdom. This calls the 
person to abandon safe, abstract expert 
positions and immerses the self in integrity 
and personal vulnerability. This requires a 
(re)learning of how to more wisely express 
feelings and experiences, while maintaining 
wisdom, spirituality and a practically-
ethically wise type of rational excellence. 
However, it also invites the affective 
sources of ourselves and others as 
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emotional beings, which requires time to 
develop trust and a deeper understanding of 
each parties’ transcendental, complicated 
personhood.  
This relies upon other cardinal and wider 
virtues that moderate autonomous, self-
interested and narrower forms of reason; 
such virtues include courage, friendship, 
generosity, and the self-awareness to 
acknowledge our tendency to run from 
intimacy in relationships (or the 
simultaneous grief and relief when others 
run away that enables us to find safety back 
in the autonomous self). Remaining 
committed and learning to display true 
community is an act of personal integrity 
related to IPS cognition and is activated 
from the person’s interiority, where various 
psychological faculties are integrated. The 
person’s ends are the interpersonal 
relationship, encounter with the other and 
learning how to work together to make 
growth and happiness possible for both 
within a wider good and higher purpose.  
Having clarified the anthropological and 
psychological assumptions associated with 
AS, PS and IPS, its application to 
leadership is very suggestive. For AS and 
PS, the aim is to be a moral person who acts 
in professional roles and who also sees 
moral frameworks as additional features to 
ensure responsible action. In addition, in 
AS, and especially in PS, professional 
integrity is understood as legitimacy for 
changing and fixing others in order to 
elevate their maturity according to a certain 
ideal that the leadership group endorses and 
in order for them to perform more 
effectively. While PS instrumentalises the 
relationship to reach the object, IPS 
instrumentalises the object to reach the 
person as an end. In both cases, the object is 
mastered and the relationship is present, but 
the two approaches are very different.  
4. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we explained how the “Inter-
Processual Self” (IPS) presents a strikingly 
different way of understanding the self and 
action in social settings and life. We 
suggested that IPS is an integrative mindset 
that considers all the aspects of human 
beings that manifest our interiority and 
singularity.  
We also suggested that the prevailing 
paradigm—whether AS/PS or IPS— 
constitutes a point of departure for 
characterising the person and results in 
different ways of understanding 
management’s role and its implications. 
The cognitive and psychosocial capacities 
that people utilise at work when relating to 
other people and groups are largely akin to 
AS and PS, namely the relationship itself is 
seen as a means or instrument of action. IPS 
presents a richer environment in which the 
interpersonal relationship is an end, thus 
facilitating understanding of how to be and 
act as a person of integrity in one’s 
singularity. In truly valuing and respecting 
others’ dignity, we do not undermine our 
own. With all of this in mind, the 
interpersonal encounter emerges as the 
medium in which leadership based on the 
common good emerges.  
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